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ATOMIC ENERGY-URANIUM PROCUREMENT-LEGAL AsPECTS OF

THE AEC DOMESTIC ORE PURCHASE PROGRAM-The federal gov~rnment's domestic uranium ore procurement program, initially
~nounced following World War II to ensure maximum exploration and development for military purposes, has met with ex_traordinary success. So improved is this country's military uranium picture that the Atomic Energy Commission was recently
able to announce that uranium concentrate purchases would not
be further increased.1 This announcement is viewed as a matter
.of serious concern by the domestic ore producer, who must continue to look to the federal government as his sole market; a
noticeable private market for peaceful uses of atomic energy fuels
may not be realized for more than a decade. 2 It becomes apparent

1 Address -by Jesse C. Johnson, director of the Atomic Energy Commission raw
materials division, before the Atomic Industrial Forum, October 28, 1957.
2 Estimates as to when a serious commercial market for peaceful uses of fissionable
materials, for which uranium ore is now the principal source, vary considerably
because of the intangibles involved in making such a prediction. A spokesman for the
Uranium Institute of America, representing ore producers, recently commented that
the uranium ore industry is about twelve years ahead of the commercial market; other
· experts set the figure at closer to ten. A former AEC official remarked in December 1957
that ,the total uranium requirement of all atomic power plants in the free world in the
next ten years will amount to between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of uranium oxide. This
figure compares with 40,000 ,tons of uranium oxide (30,000 in this country) expected
to be produced annually by free world uranium mills before 1959. WALLS~ JOURNAL,
December 18, 1957, p. 6:2. See also .testimony of Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of America, before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on
Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 2d sess.,
-Feb. 24, 1958, reported in BNA ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:70 (1958).
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that with the government market no longer unlimited, competition among producers and controversies with the AEC can be expected to grow more frequent and intense. Harbingers of such.
developments are already on the scene. The first judicial de-.
cision interpreting language in the government's guaranteed price.
circulars-Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States3-was handed
down a few months ago. It is anticipated that increasing competi-.
tion and controversy will mean a correspondingly increased in-,
spection and critical analysis of these price circulars, which at
times are confusingly or improperly drafted. This comment is.
designed to examine the legal and practical problems raised by
these guarantees, with the anticipation that these problems may
appear with considerably greater frequency in federal courts in
the span of lean years before a substantial private market for
uranium ore develops.
I. The Program and the Industry
Since Congress deliber~tely chose private enterprise as its
medium for broad and rapid expansion of uranium ore exploration and development, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (and sub-.
sequently the 1954 act) contained an authorization for AEC acquisition of uranium ore by purchase from private producers.4
This purchase program, which formed the nucleus of the federal
incentive system, was implemented by numerous fringe incentives
designed to attract the energies of both small and large-scale
prospecting and development units. At the exploration stage, for
example, the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration was.
formed to provide financial assistance to persons desiring to ex-;
plore mining properties for unknown uranium. 5 Government
technical data and facilities further encouraged exploration, 6 and
federal construction of roads and provision for transportation·
allowances permitted more economical development of discov-·

(Ct. Cl. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 403.
Atomic •Energy Act of 1946, §5(b)5, 60 Stat. 762; Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68
Stat. 933, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2096.
5 An extensive discussion of the operation of the D.M.E.A. is found in Tippit,
"Federal Incentives to Uranium Mining," 27 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 457 at 458 (1957). Since,
the writing of that article, the D.M.E.A. has reduced its percentage contribution to
allowable costs of exploration. See DMEA Order No. 1, 32A C.F.R. (1956) C. XII, as
amended 22 Fed. Reg. 8304 (1957).
6 See generally Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development,
Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 26 (1955). .
3
4
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ered deposits. 7 Initial production from mining properties was rewarded with attractive bonuses,8 and in some locations "development allowances" were paid for ore produced,° in addition to the
guaranteed price, to encourage further development of mining
properties.
But there can be no doubt that the principal incentive for
production was provided by the government's schedules of guaranteed minimum prices for uranium ores delivered to government
depots. Pursuant to its statutory authority to acquire uranium
.ore by purchase from private domestic producers, the AEC has
issued a continuing series of regulations and releases providing
an assured market for uranium ore.10 The original price schedules
took effect in 1948, and while some of the guarantees have expired, government purchases are now guaranteed until 1966.
Although certain problems arising with respect to these documents will be examined in some detail in the following sections
of this comment, a brief description of their general provisions is
perhaps desirable here. In 1948, the AEC issued two regulations
offering guaranteed minimum prices for uranium-bearing ores
and mechanical concentrates-Circular No. 3 for ores found in
the Colorado Plateau, and Circular No. 1 for ores discovered elsewhere.11 The latter regulation was applicable, however, only to
ores containing ten percent or more uranium oxide. Since no

Ibid. Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5a, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5a(a)(3)(ii).
s The Commission has for several years made a standing offer of a $10,000 bonus
for discovery of and production from new high-grade domestic uranium deposits. The
minimum grade for which the bonus will be paid is ore assaying 20% uranium oxide.
Domestic Uranium Circular No. 2, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.2(a). While ,this appears to be a
substantial incentive to initial production, it is not; no one has claimed the bonus. Hidden
Splendor Mine, one of the richest ore deposits, checked only 0.4% uranium oxide.
Mathis, "Uranium Boom Over,'' !LI.us. MAGAZINE OF WAU. STREET, Oct. 29, 1955, p. 139.
A more realistic •bonus provision is •to be found in Domestic Uranium Program Circular
No. 6, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.6.
9 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3A, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.3(b)(2)(ii); Domestic
Uranium Circular No. 5a, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5a(a)(3)(i).
10 Those regulations and releases offering a guaranteed minimum price for uranium
ore are Domestic Uranium Circular No. I, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.1; Domestic Uranium
Circular No. 3, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.3; Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5, 10 C.F.R.
(Supp. 1958) §60.5. UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY CO!ll!IIISSION Rm.EAsE No. 830, May 24,
1956, establishes for the period 1962-1966 a guaranteed minimum price for concentrate
rather than ore.
llDomestic Uranium Circular No. 3, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.3, established a three-year
guaranteed minimum price for roscoelite-type and carnotite-type ores of the Colorado
Plateau. This guarantee expired in 1951. Domestic Uranium Circular No. I, 10 C.F.R.
(_1949) §60.1, established a guaranteed minimum price for non-Plateau ores and runs
until April 11, 1958.
7
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ore of such high grade has yet been discovered,12 the only applicable provision of this regulation in practice was a statement expressing the Commission's interest "in negotiating reasonable
terms" with respect to lesser grade ores.13 It is significant to note
that the minimum grade ore for which the government was willing to offer a guaranteed price in the Colorado Plateau regulation contained but one one-hundredth the percentage of uranium
oxide as that for which guarantees were offered outside the Colorado Plateau.
Although there has been no AEC indication of the reason for
this disparity, it is perhaps explained in terms of the uranium
deposit situation at the time. Reserves outside the Plateau were
generally unknown, and the Commission's immediate goal in setting up a guaranteed price for the non-Plateau ores was no doubt
to encourage maximum exploration, rather than production.
Since it did not know the grade of ore which would be found and
since it obviously preferred to negotiate individual contracts
where possible, the Commission set a grade standard at a relatively high level. The incentive for exploration was still present,
since prospectors were equally ignorant of what they would find,
and yet the standard was sufficiently high to assure the AEC that
most of the production would be on the basis of individual contracts. On the Plateau, however, reserves were already known to
a much greater extent, and the Commission surmised that producers would without doubt require a realistic price scheme as
an incentive to maximum production. Thus the AEC set the minimum acceptable grade level at a much lower point, thereby encouraging immediate production on the Plateau.
In 1949 the guarantees for Colorado Plateau ores were extended by the AEC's Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5,14 and,
as amended, this regulation guarantees prices until 1962. Circular No. 5 contains provisions substantially similar to the original
regulation, except for slight changes in the price schedule. The
guarantees for non-Colorado Plateau high grade ore, on the other
hand, expire in 1958, and there has been no indication by the

12,Mathis, "Uranium Boom Over," !LI.us.

MAGAZINE OF

WALL STREET, Oct. 29, 1955,

p. 139.
•

13 "However, the Commission will be interested in negotiating reasonable terms
. with respect to deliveries of high-grade ores and refined products in lesser quantities
and grades than those specified in .this section." Domestic Uranium Circular No. 1, IO
C.F.R. (1949) §60.l(e).
14 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5.
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Commission of an intent to renew them. Production in these latter areas has been regulated by individual contracts with the government since no ore discovered has met the rigorous requirements of the guarantee in the original regulation. 15 There is no
reason to believe that such a practice will not be continued.
Guarantees for the years following 1962 will take a different
form. Instead of providing price schedules for uranium ore, the
government will restrict its guarantees to uranium concentrate
produced by the sixteen uranium mills16 which refine uranium
ore into concentrate by mechanical or chemical processing.17
This change in program represents a compromise by the Commission between two very different objectives: (1) supporting the
uranium producers, even though immediate government needs
for uranium are being satisfied, as a precautionary military measure until private purchasers can provide a market for uranium;
(2) preparing ore producers for the eventual replacement of the
unrealistic guaranteed market with a private market by providing
guarantees only indirectly, rather than directly as at present.
These ends are further assured by the reservation that the AEC
need accept only 500 tons of uranium oxide per year from "any
one mining property or mining operation." 18 Thus, not only will
price guarantees be less stable, ·but the market for high grade ores
will no longer be unlimited should the AEC choose to exercise
its option not to buy.
The practical effect of these changes will be examined briefly
in section II-C below, and it is enough to remark here that pos-

lli Note 12 supra.
16 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No.
17 See UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

A•45, March 7, 1958.
RELEASE No. 830, May 24, 1956.
The decision to ease the transition to a commercial market through price guarantees on
concentrates was made in preference to a recommendation of the McKinney Panel on
the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, that tonnage guarantees should be
given to producers instead of price guarantees. REPORT, PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF PEACEFUL
UsES OF ATOMIC ENERGY Ganuary 1956), p. 143. The Commission rejected the McKinney
Panel suggestion on the ground that the plan would not provide the individual producer
with assurance that ihe would be able to market all or any part of his production. If
such a program were adopted, it would require some kind of "allocation" system so that
all producers would have an opportunity to sell at least part of their production. A.E.C.
Comment ,to Recommendation 5, McKinney Panel. See Hearings of Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 397, (1956). AEC ·feeling was strong t:hat in the future the primary
commodity in the commercial market would be concentrate rather than ore, and it therefore ,would •be more realistic to put the former on a guaranteed basis than to continue supporting the latter. See address by Jesse C. Johnson, director of the AEC raw materials
division, before the Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956.
18 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. 830, May 24, 1956.
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sible slow-downs will no doubt be an unsettling experience for
the domestic producers of uranium ore. The boom fostered by
the government program since 1948, while losing its public
glamor two or three years ago, is only now beginning to fade for
the major ore-producing companies. Indeed the industry fostered
by this program is a considerable tribute to the incentive system.
As compared with 1948, when the United States could boast
practically no production of uranium ore and proven and potential reserves approximated two million tons, 19 recent AEC figures
show annual ore delivery at the rate of 3.5 million tons, with
ore reserves set at more than 78 million tons. 20 Annual
production is expected to increase to five million tons by 1959;21
sixteen uranium mills (fifteen of them privately owned) are in
operation; and more than 8,000 persons are employed in either
domestic mining or milling operations.22 Adequate production
and reserves for military purposes are realities. An industry which
has prospered in response to federal incentives is now forced to
bide its time, so to speak, until the predicted private market
develops.

II. Problems Raised by the Regulations
A. Administrative Procedure
While Circular No. 5 offers guaranteed prices for domestically produced uranium ore, it has been pointed out that these
guarantees today extend to only a small percentage of the ores
actually extracted in this country-the roscoelite-type and carnotite-type ores of the Colorado Plateau.23 For the balance of the
ore produced AEC policy has been to negotiate contracts pursuant to a note appended to Circular 5a24 upon terms often
19 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth,
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 26 (1955).
20 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEAsE No. A-45, Marcil 7, 1958.
21 Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth,
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p 85 (1957).
22 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. 1133, August 22, 1957; U.S. ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. A-45, March 7, 1958.
23 See discussion in section I supra.
24At the end of Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5a, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5a,
appears -this note: "The Commission will be interested in discussing arrangements for
delivery to it of types of uranium-bearing materials other than those for which guaranteed
prices have been established, such as tailings, mill products, and ores of types not acceptable under §§60.5 and 60.5a." Presumably, the Commission is also basing its negotiated
contract policy upon a similar note in Circular No. I. See note 13 supra. This latter
provision expires in April 1958.
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reportedly less attractive than those of the Circular and in areas
not covered by the Circular. It has been contended25 that this
practice violates section 3(a) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act providing that "No person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not . . . published"
in the Federal Register.26 The contention is apparently based
upon the theory that the note in the circular fails to give the required notice of the practice of negotiating contracts outside the
Colorado Plateau on terms other than those published in the
circular.
It is submitted that the Commission's practice does not violate section 3(a) of the act. That section was enacted to protect
"the public from being required to pursue remedies which are
not generally known." 27 Although the circular in general applies
only to the Colorado Plateau, the terms of the appended note
do not purport to be limited to that area, and cover only materials
for which guaranteed prices have not been established. Further,
judicial construction of section 3(a) indicates that it was intended as a protection against enforcement of unpublished procedural and organizational rules, as distinct from the voluntary
contracts, arguably of a substantive nature, negotiated by the
Commission pursuant to the note.28
B. Contractual Provisions
Circulars offering guaranteed minimum prices for unlimited
amounts of property meeting certain specifications are necessarily
25 A letter from Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of
America, to the Michigan Law Review, January 21, 1958, states in part: "It ... has been
the policy of the AEC to negotiate individual contracts for the purchase of uranium
ore in locations not covered by Circular 5 and 5A.•.. You will note that at the end of
Circular 5A a note is included indicating that the Commission will be interested in
discussion of arrangements for the delivery of all types of uranium bearing materials
other than those for which guaranteed prices have been established. On the basis of
this notation, the Commission has contended that it ·has the authority to negotiate
individual purchase contracts with uranium producers. . • . A contention that this
procedure may not be in conformance with .the Administrative Procedure Act, Section
3(a) is now being studied by the Uranium Institute."
26 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1002(a).
21 S. Rep. 752, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 12 (1945).
28 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Hotch v. United States,
(9th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 280; United States v. Morelock, (D.C. Md. 1954) 124 F. Supp.
932; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). Each of these cases involved the procedural
validity of attempted enforcement of agency rules and remedies, unlike the voluntary
and substantive nature of the contracts anticipated by the AEC circulars. See Newman,
"Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations,'"
63 HARV. L. REv. 929 at 930, n. 5 (1950).
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curious documents in the contractual sense. The rather loose
draftsmanship of the regulations in question adds little to their
clarity, and one may be certain that considerable judicial introspection will be necessary if these regulations continue to form
the nucleus of the domestic procurement program. Specifically,
matters of (1) offer and acceptance, (2) revocability, and (3)
liquidated damages require clarification.
I. Offer and Acceptance. While the provisions of Circular
No. 1 expire this year, they are of extreme interest to the industry
inasmuch as Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States construes them
in such a way as to have a far-reaching impact upon ·persons relying upon later circulars. Circular No. 1 provides that one "who
has domestic refined uranium, high-grade uranium bearing ores,
or mechanical concentrates of the quantity and grade specified
in paragraph (e) . . . may offer it for delivery to the Commission ..." whereupon the latter, upon receipt of this offer and an
acceptable sample, "will forward to the person making the offer
a form of contract ... ready for his acceptance." (Emphasis supplied.)29 Although this language is not altogether internally consistent, it strongly indicates government intention to make, by the
"guaranteed price" circulars, a mere invitation to the industry to
submit offers. In the Uranium Mines decision, the government
attorney took this precise position, but the court held his interpretation of the circular untenable:
"The title of Circular No. 1 was 'Ten Year Guaranteed
Minimum Price.' Its purpose was to induce persons to find
and mine uranium. The Government had imposed such
restrictions and prohibitions upon private transactions in
uranium that no one could have prudently engaged in its
production unless he was assured of a Government market.
It could surely not be urged that one who had complied in
every respect with the terms of the Circular could have been
told by the Government that it would pay only half the
'Guaranteed Minimum Price,' nor could he be told that the
Government would not purchase his uranium at all.'' 30
While the court's interpretation seems to contravene the expressed intent of the circular, its conclusion that the government
cannot escape its obligation to buy from one who has produced
in reliance on the circular seems reasonable and just. Once having
29 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 1, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §§60.l(c) and (d).
so Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 403 at 406.
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determined this important question, however, the court does not
go farther to define clearly the precise contractual setting which
it found to have existed. If it is admitted that the government has
made an offer, is it one of a unilateral contract, with delivery or tender to be the act of acceptance, or one of a bilateral contract, looking to a return promise to sell?31 Despite the fact that the specific
language of the circular may be said at most to make an offer of
a bilateral contract, it might be concluded that the Uranium
Mines court would find a unilateral contract to have existed. The
facts that the circular offered guaranteed prices "for the delivery
to the Commission ..." (emphasis supplied),32 and that the government market was exclusive and its military demand potentially unlimited for the ten-year period, point to the conclusion
that the government probably would have looked to an act rather
than a promise as the form of acceptance. It had little need of
prior assurances of performance, with no other buyer in sight.
Having stated exact requirements for acceptable ores or concentrates, the government appeared less interested in a return promise than in the act of delivery. If, on the other hand, the government's circular represented an offer of a bilateral contract, the
contract would be binding only in the event that a court reads
in a return implied promise to deliver. While this is no doubt
possible, the unilateral construction, it is submitted, may be
termed more realistic in view of the economic conditions surrounding promulgation of the Circular.
Circular No. 3, as extended by Circular No. 5, contains language sufficiently similar to Circular No. I to warrant the inference that the same result would be reached in both instances.
Significant in the former is the absence of detailed procedures
81 The familiar difference between the unilateral and bilateral contract, both as to
the requisite operative acts of the parties and the legal relations created by -those acts,
is discussed in I CORBIN, CONTRACTS §21 et seq. (1950), where it is pointed out that certain
unilateral contracts are not "bargains." It appears clear that in refusing to adhere to
the government's "interpretation" of the circular, the Uranium Mines court was not
"interpreting" the circular in ~he generally accepted sense of discovering the meaning
of its language and terms, but was rather "construing" it, i.e., determining its legal
effect. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §534 (1950). If an offer be understood as a statement
or proposal -by one party of Jiis assent to certain definite terms whereby he creates in
the other party the power ·by acceptance to bind the offeror, the court's apparent construction of tlle circular as an offer seems reasonable. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball
Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 484, affd. [1893] I Q. B. 256.
82 Domestic Uranium Circular No. I, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.l(a). It is not unreasonable
to conclude, the circular having been given the legal effect of an offer, that the Commission, having specified carefully ,the required conditions of quantity and quality,
looked ro -the act of delivery of acceptable ore as the mode of acceptance.
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for offer and acceptance, indicating in general a stronger intention
to constitute delivery as acceptance. While there is some language
in Circular No. 3 pointing similarly to the formation of a bilateral
contract,33 the policy factors motivating the Radium Mines decision would undoubtedly dictate the unilateral construction were
the government to refuse acceptance of qualified ore.
2. Revocability of Offer. More perplexing, perhaps, than the
determination of the nature of the offer involved, is the question
of the revocability of the guaranteed price offers found in the
circulars. While this question was not in precise issue in the
Radium Mines decision, it is one which may conceivably become
important if government oversupply becomes too great or the
government should wish to reduce the price levels now
offered.
It is settled beyond doubt that an offer is ordinarily revocable
by the offeror any time prior to acceptance, even when the offer
is expressly declared to be "irrevocable."34 A continuing offer is
enforceable as a "binding option" only when it is accompanied
by an enforceable collateral promise not to revoke, or when the
offer, left open for a specified period, becomes binding by virtue
of a seal, consideration rendered in exchange, or subsequent
action in reliance on it.35 It appears that if the government, therefore, attempted to revoke the guaranteed price schedule before
a particular producer had accepted by tender or delivery, the
sole basis upon which he could insist on enforcement of the offer,
aside from doubtfully applicable doctrine of part performance
in response to an offer of a unilateral contract,36 would be the
33 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.3, provides in §(d): "Sellers
desiring to deliver in excess of 1,000 short tons (2,000 pounds per ton) of ores during
any calendar year will be required to execute a contract with the Commission." But
consideration of .the next sentence in the circular limiting the obligation of the Commission to purchase to 5,000 short tons per calendar year, along with the other terms
of the circular, indicates that §(d) was included rather as a device to insure better
administration of the purchase program than as a manifestation of an intent not to be
bound until completion of the contract.
34 Night Commander Lighting Co. v. Brown, 213 Mich. 214, 181 N.W. 979 (1921);
Grieve v. Mullaly, 211 Cal. 77, 293 P. 619 (1930). See generally Boston &: Maine Railroad
v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. (57 Mass.) 224 (1849); Wight v. Linden, 69 Wyo. 67, 237 P. (2d) 475
(1951).
35 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §42 (1950).
36 The seller's acts of exploration, mining, and collecting the ore would appear to
constitute acts in preparation to render the requested act of performance, tender or
delivery, and not strictly part performance. See Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44
N.W. 669 (1890); Curtis v. American C. &: R. Co., 38 App. D.C. 115 (1912). See also 1
CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §45, comment a (1932). When, however, it is remembered that
as pointed out in section I supra, part at least of the government's motivation in issuing
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elusive concept of promissory estoppel.37 The Uranium Mines
decision, while not deciding this question directly, contains language indicating a willingness to support such an argument should
the proper case arise.38
If this is the proper interpretation of the court's language,
then it would appear to contradict the reasoning of Judge Learned
Hand in the leading case of James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.39
The court held that when an offer is made for a stipulated return "equivalent" from the offeree, either a requested return
promise or act, promissory estoppel does not apply when the reliance action is other than the requested return promise or act.
Judge Hand's opinion would therefore limit the applicability of
promissory estoppel to situations such as in charitable subscriptions in which the offeror requests no specific equivalent as a
bargained-for exchange for his promise. Although Judge Hand
applied his limitation in the context of an offer of a bilateral
contract, the reasoning would appear equally applicable to an
offer of a unilateral contract. It may be argued, however, that
the limitation of the Baird case, while well-adapted to ordinary
commercial transactions where an offer looks to a definite time
the guaranteed prices was probably to induce exploration, the part performance argument is considerably strengthened, despite use of the unequivocal phrase "for delivery"
actually employed in the circulars. Note also the argument in 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §51
(1950), that when the offeree's acts in preparation to render the requested act are foreseeable to -the offeror, the offer should ·be iheld to be irrevocable. See Abbott v. Stephany
Poultry Co., 5 Terry (44 Del.) 513, 62 A. (2d) 243 (1948).
37 1 CONTRACTS R!i:sTATEMENT §90 (1932): "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
,if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
as Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 403 at 406: "It
could surely not be urged -that one who h_ad complied in every respect with the terms
of the Circular could have been told by the government that it would pay only half
the 'Guaranteed Minimum Price,' nor could he be told that the government would not
purchase his uranium at all." If by compliance "in every respect" the court meant to
include the act of delivery or tender of ore, the language quoted may not necessarily
indicate a willingness to apply promissory estoppel. Counsel for plaintiff argued promissory estoppel, but since the decision for the government was based on another ground,
the court nowhere ruled squarely on the applicability of -the doctrine. Although finding
in favor of plaintiff on the question of the nature of the government's offer, the court
ultimately held for defendant on the ground that plaintiff's ore had not met the terms
of the Circular.
39 (2d Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 344. The limitation ~as been invoked in cases involving
sub-contractor's bids and options for renewals of leases. See R. J. Daum Construction Co.
v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P. (2d) 817 (1952); American Handkerchief Corp. v. Frannat
Realty Co., 17 N.J. 12, 109 A. (2d) 793 (1954). But see Northwestern Engineering Co. v.
Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W. (2d) 879 (1943). Cf. Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co., 5
Terry (44 Del.) 513, 62 A. (2d) 243 (1948).
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and form of acceptance, should not be imposed in cases arising
under these guaranteed price offers, since: (I) the duration of the
offer is a specified number of years and is not controlled by the offeree' s acceptance; (2) timely acceptance by an offeree is not necessary in view of the relative stability of the uranium market; (3)
unlike the offer in the Baird case, these offers are made generally
to a potentially unlimited number of sellers and the government
is not concerned primarily with acceptance by a single offeree.
3. Liquidated Damages. In contrast to the government indication in Circular No. I that it is willing to negotiate contracts for
ores below the grade of those for which prices are guaranteed,
Circular No. 3 states that any below-grade ores which are delivered to the purchase depot shall become the property of the
buyer as liquidated damages for the buyer's expense of weighting,
sampling, and assaying. . . ." 40 The validity of this provision is
open to serious question, although it must be admitted that it
provides an effective means of insuring that ores delivered to
the depot will have been tested for grade by the producer beforehand. Nevertheless, the clause appears to violate two well established rules concerning liquidated damages.
The Restatement of Contracts, cited by numerous courts41
with approval, states:

"An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not
affect the damages recoverable for the breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation."42
In the clause in question, neither of the conditions necessary
to validity, viz., a "reasonable forecast" and damages "very difficult of accurate estimation," is apparent. With respect to the first
condition, a forfeiture of all the ore that a producer may mistakenly deliver to the depot cannot logically be termed a reason40 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3a, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.3a(b)(2)(i). A similar
provision appears in Circular 5a.
41 E.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. Le Roy
Dyal Co., (3d Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 460, cert. den. 341 U.S. 926 (1951); Management,
Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wash. (2d) 321, 235 P. (2d) 293 (1951). No decision has been
found in which the facts involved forfeiture of non-conforming goods as liquidated
damages for the prospective buyer's expense in handling the goods.
42 1 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §339 (1932).
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able forecast of the harm caused by the breach. While perhaps
the expense of weighing the ore may bear a reasonable relation
to the quantity of ore forfeited, no similar relationship exists to
costs of assaying and sampling. Nor do these costs bear a relation
to the quality of ore delivered; yet conceivably, ore containing
0.09 percent uranium oxide is considerably more valuable than
ore containing 0.01 percent. No attempt is made in the clause to
reconcile these differences in actual economic effect in the individual case.
Moreover, it does not appear, in accordance with the second
Restatement condition, that damages are incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. Man-hours lost in weighing,_ sampling,
and assaying, plus any haulage costs involved in disposing of the
unwanted ore, would appear to be highly accurate measures of
the harm to the government and relatively easy to ascertain. The
amount of damages, of course, must be based upon losses to the
damaged party, so the suggested factors should be determinative
in a given case.43
In the broad sense, too, the clause involves clear inconsistency.
On the one hand, the government rejects these ores as worthless
to its program, thus rendering them in a closed market worthless
for any purpose. On the other hand it accepts the ore as liqui-·
dated damages, thereby imputing to the ore a value equivalent
to the government's handling expenses. A court test of this pro-

43 There would appear to be little room for contention by the government that
damages are uncertain ,because of the varying quality of ores forfeited. This factor looks
to the uncertainty of the producer's loss because of forfeiture, and would not be a
measure of the government's damages. To the contrary, the government has fixed its
damages in terms of costs of weighing, sampling, and assaying. Since contract damages
are intended only to compensate, no other basis appears justified. See 5 CORBIN, CoN•
TRACTS §1002 (1950). If this is true, then the liquidated damages clause becomes un.
warranted-actual damages being a matter of relative certainty. Courts frequently strike
down liquidated damages provisions awarding an identical amount to the injured party
in the event of any breach of the contract, no matter how important or insignificant.
See, e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); Illinois Surety Co. v. United
States, (2d Cir. 1916) 229 F. 527. The present provision presents the opposite side of the
coin: for an injury which should not appreciably vary from case to case, property is forfeited which may range in value from nothing to a considerable amount, depending upon
uranium oxide content. "Punishment of a promisor for breach, without regard to the
extent of !harm -that he has caused, is an unjust and unnecessary remedy." CONTRACTS
RE.sTATEMENT §339, comment a (1932). The sole argument that .the clause does not impose
a punishment is that in fact the government may be doing -the producer a favor in disposing of unwanted ores, ·by relieving the latter of the expense connected therewith.
This contention appears tenuous in view (1) of -the phrasing of the clause as a compensatory scheme and (2) the eventual chance that presently unwanted ores may become
valuable with development of better refining processes and/or short supply of uranium.
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v1s1on, it is submitted, will almost certainly result in finding the
clause invalid.
C. Practical Considerations
As already indicated, 1962 will bring a shift in the emphasis of
AEC guarantees. A minimum price will be offered by the Commission for concentrate, rather than the ore itself, in the hope
that the change will in part prepare the uranium mining industry
for ultimate total elimination of an artificial market. A price of
eight dollars per pound of contained uranium oxide has been
tentatively set by the Commission.44
The need for extension of at least a modified form of guarantee was obvious. The much-heralded civilian market for uranium
has been slow to develop and may only be said to lie ahead in
the indefinite future. 45 Keenly· aware of this situation and the
fact that ore guarantees under Circular No. 5 would expire in 1962,
ore producers geared production to a 1962 target date for exhaustion of their reserves. With Circular No. 5 placing no limitation
upon the amount of ore that buying stations would accept
annually, producers were literally flooding the mills with more
ore than the government wanted or could use. On the other hand,
these same motivating factors portended a decline in the exploration phase of the mining operation, the phase ultimately most
important to the federal government.46
To reverse the unbalancing effect of the approaching 1962

44 U.S. ATOMIC EN.ERGY COMMISSION RELEAsE No. 830, May 24, 1956. There has been
no regulation equivalent to the ore circulars which would put this guaranteed price
officially into effect, despite the fact that more than eighteen months have passed since
promulgation of the release. See remarks of Patrick J. Hurley, President, Uranium Institute of America, before New Mexico Economic Development Council, December 9,
1957. The resulting uncertainty in the price ultimately to be guaranteed could conceivably
result in financing difficulties for the industry. For an example of the potential economic
crisis caused by this delay, see the testimony of Governor Milward L. Simpson of Wyoming
at Hearings •before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and
State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 24, 1958, reported in BNA
ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:70 (1958).
45 See note 3 supra. The AEC has traditionally been the source of the most optimistic
estimates as to civilian nuclear power needs for uranium. Late in 1957, however, the
chief of the Commission's commercial development branch stated that he did not believe
that nuclear power would become economically competitive before the late 1960's. See
WAIL STREET J., Dec. 18, 1957, p. 6:2.
46 One of the arguments cited by the AEC in favor of concentrate guaranteed prices
over the McKinney Panel recommendation, note 17 supra, of tonnage guarantees was
the need for continuing assurance to those engaged in exploration and development
that there would .be an adequate market. Address by Jesse C. Johnson, director of the
AEC raw materials division, before the Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956.
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target date, the government extended its program, albeit shifting
to indirect guarantees, and reserved the right to place a relatively liberal ceiling upon the amount of uranium ore it would
buy annually from "any one mining property or mining operation. " 47 Its eight dollar price, while lower than prices now
offered for concentrates, will by 1962 probably be only a slight
depressant on production-prices offered for concentrates having
decreased steadily with the discovery of more efficient milling
processes.48 The comparative silence of the industry with respect
to the price is a rather good indication that producers are not
unduly concerned.
A regulation placing the new price guarantees into official
form has not been promulgated.49 The AEC release in which the
concentrate price program was announced, however, states that
concentrate producers who desire to sell "will be required to enter
into contracts specifying the period of delivery, the quantity to
be delivered, the rate of delivery, the place of delivery, the type
of packaging and other standard provisions of commercial type
contracts." 50 Even more clearly than in Circulars No. 1 and 5,
the government here ·appears to be looking to negotiated bilateral
contracts. If the circular which is published to make the new
program official contains similar language, it will be difficult

47Note 18 supra. In practice, this provision will mean that if the Commission desires,
it may limit a single mine or operation to production of about 200,000 tons of average
grade Plateau ore per year. Address of Philip Merritt, Senior Geologist, Longyear Company, before Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956. See also Knabel, "Uranium Mining," ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL F0Ru111 IV, p. 26 (1956). AEC figures for fiscal year 1957 indicate,
however, that only six shippers out of a total of 727 produced :more ,than 100,000 tons
of ore for the year. Address of Elton A. Youngberg, Assistant Manager for Operations,
Grand Junction Operations Office, United States Atomic Energy Commission, ·before a
symposium on the future of uranium at Denver, Colorado, December 16, 1957. Thus
while there has been no definition as yet of the phrase "any one mining property or
mining operation," any semantically justifiable definition will not appear -to work undue
hardship.
48 The average price paid for domestically produced concentrate in fiscal year 1956
was $11.60 per pound for uranium oxide; in 1957, it -was $10.50. The estimate for the
current fiscal year is $9.60 and .for 1959, $9.30. WALL STREET J., December 17, 1957, p.
8:2. Commenting upon the extended program, Jesse C. Johnson of the AEC has stated:
"As I have indicated, the guaranteed $8. price was based on a study of conditions today.
We have no crystal 1ball to tell what economic conditions will be in 1962 or 1966•••• If
the price is too low, it can be raised, or special premiums established for marginal
production." Address .before Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956. See also remarks
of Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of America, at Hearings
before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of the
Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 281 (1957).
49 See note 44 supra.
50 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEAsE No. 830, May 24, 1956.
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for future courts to ignore, as did the Uranium Mines decision,
the specific import of the language. Yet those same considerations
which motivated the unorthodox construction by the Uranium
Mines court will be generally present.51 The question may well
become crucial in the coming decade if the government market
is not further extended, and a substantial commercial market has
not developed.
This potential hiatus between the termination of government
guarantees and development of private demand, the recent slowdown in expansion of AEC purchases, and the ever-present threat
that the fusion process52 may make uranium an obsolete fuel, all
point toward a disquieting future for the uranium industry.
While it is certain that the government has no intention-as a
matter of military preparedness-to permit the industry to die
altogether, there is also little reason for the government to maintain production at the present high level. Ideally, the AEC would
no doubt like the producers to continue extensive explorations
so that we may more accurately know our reserves. It need only
support the companies to the extent that this limited end is
assured.
Ill. Conclusion

The tranquility which has attended the government's domestic uranium procurement program since its inception may be
traced directly to the phenomenon of a buyer willing to accept
a greater volume of goods than sellers can produce. This market
situation is now changing, and as government demand becomes
more limited, so also the producers' unquestioning attitude toward arbitrary or confusing provisions of the government guaran51 Still present will be .the factors of a controlled, single-purchaser market (until
a private market develops), producer reliance upon the guarantees as the basis for
operations, and ostensible government willingness to buy up to the amount specified
from any one mining property. There is no specification, :however, of delivery of the
ore as the apparent mode of acceptance in .the release, as there has been in the circulars.
In view of the non-official nature of the AEC release, an interesting question arises as
to the right of the government to set, in its official regulation, a price lower than the
eight dollar figure of the release. Perhaps a court might answer the question by asking
itself to what extent the industry, in its present production, relies upon the specific
announced price as compared to a lower one. Reliance may be based, however, upon
the mere fact of extension of guarantees and not the specific price set.
52 This factor, together with the possibility that breeder-type reactors will eventually
diminish the demand for new uranium ore, was pointed out by Dr. Willard F. Libby,
member of the AEC, in an address before the National Western Mining Conference,
February 8, 1957.
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tees will disappear.53 Those producers fortunate enough to survive the lean years of transition to a civilian market will undoubtedly do so in part by demanding clarifications of their contractual
relations with the government and gearing their operations accordingly.*
Michael Scott, S.Ed.
Edward M. Heppenstall

53 For an indication of the producers' present dissatisfaction with the AEC program
and the future that it offers the industry, see the testimony of Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of America, at Hearings before Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry,
85th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 24, 1958, reported in BNA ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:70 (1958).

• After this comment was in page proof, the AEC announced that it had taken
action which would "expand to a limited extent domestic uranium procurement." This
decision reversed the earlier Commission policy, announced in October 1957, to limit
further expansion of domestic concentrate production. The Commission now estimates
that, as a result of the added planned procurement, annual concentrate production would .
be expanded by about 2500 tons of uranium oxide. See U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
R.ELEAsE No. A-71, April 2, 1958. Primary motivation .for the government action was a
detailed report completed by the A.E.C. division of raw materials on March 31, 1958,
describing the domestic mining and milling problems growing out of the earlier
policy.-M.S.

